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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL INCOME TAX-APPLICATION OF ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
-In a case of first impression the Tax Court has refused to rule on
whether compensation determined to be unreasonable via section 162
of the Internal Revenue Code should be subject to the accumulated
earnings tax.
Dielectric Materials Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 587 (1972).
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code' (Code) entitles a corpora-
tion to deduct a reasonable amount for compensation paid for personal
services.2 Although there has been some dispute as to the legislative
purpose behind section 162,3 it seems clear that the section was in-
tended to limit the compensation of employees who are also stock-
holders to only that compensation which is reasonable in light of the
circumstances.4 To the extent that earnings can be distributed by a
corporation to its shareholders without incurring a corporate tax on
these earnings, an overall tax benefit will result. Since corporate earn-
1. Unless specified otherwise, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, which states:
(a) In General-There shall be allowed all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services ac-
tually rendered ....
3. See Griswold, New Light on "A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries," 59 I-I~v. L. Rzv.
286 (1945). The author writes:
There is in fact a clear basis for showing that the purpose of Congress in adding the
'reasonable allowance for salaries' clause was to enlarge the preceding language of
the section, and to permit the deduction of an allowance for salaries although no
salaries were in fact paid. This additional material makes it plain that the manner
of introducing the clause in question with the word 'including' was intentional, and
that the clause furnishes no basis whatever for the assumption by the Treasury of
a visitatorial power over salary payments through the medium of a disallowance of
the deduction of payments actually made.
id. at 287.
4. See Alvarez, The Deductibility of Reasonable Compensation in the Close Corpora-
tion, 11 SAN. CLAR. Lwy. 20 n.4 (1970), citing Revenue Act of 1916, Reg. 33 (revised), Art.
138, which provides:
Salaries of officers or employees who are stockholders will be subject to close analysis,
and if they are found to be out of proportion to the volume of business transacted, or
excessive when compared with the salaries of like officers or employees of other cor-
porations doing a similar kind or volume of business, the amount so paid in excess of
reasonable compensation for the services will not be deductible from gross income, but
will be treated as a distribution of profits.
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ings are taxed at 48 per cent above $25,000 of taxable income," each
dollar paid to a shareholder-employee which is deductible as compensa-
tion will usually result in an overall tax savings of 48 cents.6 The only
alternative available for distributions of earnings to a shareholder is a
dividend which is not deductible by the corporation.7
In order for compensation to be deductible two tests must be met:
(1) the compensation must in fact be payment purely for services; 8 and
(2) the amount of payment must be reasonable in light of the services
performed.9 The presence of -these two elements has been the central
issue in a myriad of cases.
Since Dielectric's formation in 1946, Hans D. Isenberg had been its
principal shareholder owning 950 of a total of 1,000 shares. The re-
maining 50 shares were owned by Isenberg's, wife. In addition to being
majority stockholder, Isenberg was president-treasurer of Dielectric
during the entire taxable year in 1966. The Tax Court's findings of
fact established that Isenberg served as chief engineer of Dielectric
from its inception and throughout 1966. He is the holder of a number
of engineering degrees and with respect to the technological endeavors
of Dielectric, he was the only employee capable of discharging these
duties. Isenberg's technical skills were well known throughout the trade
and substantially and continually enhanced Dielectric's reputation.
The court found that during 1966 Isenberg spent 45 to 50 hours per
week at the Dielectric plant. Although he took a three week vacation
and spent eleven weeks at his summer home, some of this time was also
spent on Dielectric's business.
In 1953, Dielectric's board of directors decided to pay Isenberg, as
compensation for services, 5 per cent of the net sales of Dielectric in
addition to his previously established annual salary of $40,000.
Through 1966 Isenberg's rate of compensation had not been altered.
Since 1961 and up to and including the taxable year 1966, Isenberg, as
majority stockholder, had not been paid any dividends.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
6. See Alvarez, The Deductibility of Reasonable Compensation in the Close Corpora-
tion, 11 SAN. CLAP. Lwy. 20, 21 (1970).
7. See generally INT. RLEv. CODE OF 1954, § 316.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (b)(l) (1954), provides:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price
of services, is not deductible.
9. Id. § (b)(3), which reads:
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is reason-
able under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to assume that reasonable and
true compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services
by like enterprises under like drcumstances.
940
Vol. 12: 939, 1974
Recent Decisions
In Dielectric Materials Co. v. Commissioner,a° the Commissioner re-
lied on section 162 in asserting a tax deficiency in Dielectric Material
Company's 1966 tax return.
Since the findings of fact apparently established the unquestionable
value of Isenberg to Dielectric, the court found it necessary only to in-
ferentially deal with the test of whether the compensation paid to Isen-
berg was in fact payment purely for services.'1 Rather, the court chose
to deal with the correlated test of whether or not the amount of the
compensation in question represented a reasonable allowance for such
services.12
Over the years, courts have considered a substantial number of dif-
ferent factors in dealing with this type of factual issue.13 Thus, the
Dielectric court had a variety of choices in determining the reasonable-
ness of compensation in relation to services rendered.
The court pointed out that the burden of proving the reasonableness
of compensation is on the taxpayer.' 4 In the case of a closed corpora-
tion, the courts become suspicious if the employee to whom the salary
was paid is in control of the corporate employer's affairs. Under such
circumstances the corporate taxpayer is subject to close scrutiny. 5 The
Commissioner's determination regarding what constitutes a reasonable
compensation carries with it a clear presumption of correctness which
can be rebutted by the taxpayer's showing of error in the Commission-
er's determination.'" Where a taxpayer's evidence is so equivocal or
tenuous as not to afford a satisfactory basis for determining the value
of the services rendered or the reasonableness of the compensation, the
court may hold that the taxpayer has failed to sustain this burden.Y
10. 57 T.C. 587 (1972).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1954).
12. Id. § (b)(3).
13. See Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949). Some of the
"traditional" factors considered in Mayson were:
[ . . [T]he employee's qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the employee's
work; the size and complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid with the
gross income and the net income; the prevailing general economic conditions; com-
parison of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensa-
tion for comparable positions in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer
as to all employees; and in the case of small corporations with a limited number of
officers the amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years.
Id. at 119.
14. See Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 293 (1929); Anthony Mennuto v.
Commissioner; 56 T.C. 910, 921 (1971).
15. See Darco Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 190, 191 (2d Cir. 1962); Nowland
v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 450, 455 (4th Cir. 1957).
16. See Miles-Conley Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1949).




Dielectric failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the Commis-
sioner's finding, and the court found that the corporation had in fact
paid Isenberg unreasonable compensation.18 The court, however, was
unclear as to precisely why Dielectric failed in its appeal. Instead, the
court attributed its decision to a number of indistinct reasons, each of
which individually would not be determinative of the issue.19 The
court cited R.H. Oswald v. Commissioner,20 for the rationale that it is
within the Tax Court's province to reject long established compensa-
tion arrangements which do not represent a free bargain between the
corporation and the shareholder-employee. Against this rationale, Isen-
berg's 13 year unchanged compensation agreement was not considered
significant by the court because during the entire period of the agree-
ment Isenberg owned 95 per cent of the stock and was for all practical
purposes the sole distributee of the earnings, whether labeled dividends
or compensation.
On the other hand, the court did consider it meaningful that Dielec-
tric did not pay any dividends during the taxable years 1962 through
1966, despite the existence of substantial earnings. Importance was
placed on the fact that Isenberg was away from Dielectric's business for
fourteen weeks during the 1966 taxable year. Despite his absence, 1966
was the most profitable year for Isenberg under his percentage com-
pensation agreement.
The court's refusal to attribute Dielectric's unusually successful year
to Isenberg's efforts was based upon a series of war cases where enor-
mous profits were suddenly made as a result of market conditions
18. While the court disagreed with the Commissioner, it apparently did find that
Dielectric failed to prove the Commissioner's finding was clearly wrong, since the court
upheld the finding. The court stated:
The long and the short of the situation is that we agree with neither petitioner nor
respondent. On the basis of the entire record herein and our evaluation of the testi-
mony, we hold that, of the $142,234 paid to Isenberg by petitioner in 1966, $110,000
constituted reasonable compensation for services rendered.
57 T.C. at 592.
19. Two examples of the court's vague reasoning are:
Although not determinative, the fact that Isenberg's compensation arrangement had
been established some 13 years before the taxable year in issue and had remained un-
changed throughout the intervening period should not be completely ignored . . .
although not determinative, fortuitous occurrences not related to the actual services
performed by an employee may appropriately be considered in determining the rea-
sonableness of the employee's compensation.
Id. at 591.
20. 185 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.. 1950).
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rather than the services of the corporation's employees.21 The court
stated that there was no evidence to justify the increase in compensa-
tion to Isenberg. His duties and responsibilities during the taxable year
in question remained the same as in prior years. Thus, the court 'con-
cluded that Dielectric's brighter financial situation for the taxable yeai
of 1966 was not the result of any new and specific actions of 'Isenberg.
The court's decision as to the unreasonableness of Isenberg's compen
sation resulted in the perplexing problem of' how to treat that portion
of compensation which wts determined to be unreasonable. The afore-
mentioned facts precipitated consideration of the accumulated earnings,
tax, treated in sections 531. through*537 of the Code.22
21. See Huchkins Tool & Die, Inc. v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1961) (held;
that the increase in profits was due to the Korean War rather, than an increase in the
duties and responsibilities of the executives or in the value of their services);' Burford-
Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1951).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531. Imposition of Accumulated Earnings Tax.
In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed for each
taxable year on the, accumulated taxable income (as defined in section 535) of every.
corporation described in section 532, an accumulated earnings 'tax equal. i the sum
of-
(1) 27 per cent of the accumulated taxable income not in excess of $100,000 plus
(2) 38V per cent of the accumulated taxable income in excess of $100,000.
Id. § 532. Corporations Subject to Accumulated Earnings Tax.
(a) General Rule.-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531 shall apply
to every corporation . . . formed or availed of. for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by
permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided 'or distributed.
Id. § 533. Evidence of Purpose to Avoid Income Tax.
(a) Unreasonable Accumulation Determination of Purpose.-For purposes of section
532, the fact the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to.
avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the (pre-
ponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
Id. § 534. Burden of Proof.'
(a) General Rule.-In any proceeding before the Tax Court involving a notice of de-
ficiency based in whole or in part on the allegation that all or any part of the earnings
and profits have been permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of, the
business, the burden of proof with respect to such allegation shall-
(1) if notification has not been sent in accordance with subsection (b), be on the
Secretary or his delegate, or
(2) if the taxpayer has submitted the statement described in subsection (c), be -on
the Secretary or his delegate with respect to the grounds set forth in such statement
in accordance with the provisions of such subsection.
(b) Notification by Secretary.-Before mailing the notice of deficiency referred, to in
subsection (a) the Secretary or his delegate may send by certified mail or registered
mail a notification informing the taxpayer that the proposed noticeof deficiency in-
cludes an amount with respect to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by section
531 ....
(c) Statement by Taxpayer.-Within such time '(but not less than 30 days) after the
mailing of the notification described in subsection (b) as the Secretary or his delegate
may prescribe by regulations, the taxpayer may submit a statement of the grounds
together with facts sufficient to show the basis thereof) on which the taxpayer relies
to establish that all or any part of the earnings and profits have not been permitted
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
943,
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THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
Briefly, section 531 imposes the accumulated earnings tax; section
532 provides that every corporation formed or availed of for "the pur-
pose" of avoiding the income tax of its shareholders by permitting earn-
ings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed
shall be subject to the tax; section 533 provides that the fact that earn-
ings and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of "the purpose" unless the
corporation by a preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the con-
trary; section 534 deals with the burden of proof; section 535 defines
"accumulated taxable income" upon which the tax under section 531 is
based; and section 537 provides that the term "reasonable needs of the
business" includes the reasonably anticipated needs of the business.2
The accumulated earnings tax of section 531 has its origins in the
Revenue Act of. 1913,24: which provided that if a corporation was
"formed or fraudulently availed of" for the purpose of escaping the
individual income tax by permitting gains and profits to accumulate in
the corporation, each shareholder's ratable share of the corporate in-
come was taxable to him whether distributed or not.25
A basic function of the accumulated earnings tax is to prevent share-
holders of a corporation from allowing a surplus to accumulate and
then return via a corporate liquidation. If this were permitted, a tax-
Id. § 535. Accumulated Taxable Income.
(a) Definition.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "accumulated taxable income"
means the taxable income, adjusted in the manner provided in subsection (b), minus
... the accumulated earnings credit (as defined in subsection (c)).
(b) Adjustments to Taxable Income.-For purposes of subsection (a), taxable income
shall be adjusted as follows:
(1) Taxes.-There shall be allowed as a deduction Federal income and excess profits
taxes . . . accrued during the taxable year ....
(c) Accumulated Earnings Credit.-
(1) General Rule. For purposes of subsection (a), in the case of a corporation ...
the accumulated earnings credit is (A) an amount equal to such part of the earnings
and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the
business ....
(2) Minimum Credit.-The credit allowable under paragraph (1) shall in no case
be less than the amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated earnings and
profits of the corporation at the close of the preceding taxable year.
Id. § 537. Reasonable Needs of the Business.
For purposes of *this part, the term "reasonable needs of the business" includes the
reasonably anticipated needs of the business.
23. Magic Mart Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 755, 788-90 (1969).
24. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166-67, as amended 26 U.S.C. § 551 (1954).
25. B. BIrrxxa & J. EusrIcE, FEmERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
nOLDERS 8-2 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BrrrITE & EUSTICE].
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payer would receive capital gains treatment at liquidation and would
escape paying taxes at ordinary rates on dividends. 2 As a practical mat-
ter the accumulated earnings tax is limited to the closely held corpora-
tion, since in a publicly held corporation the threat of stockholder pres-
sure or legal action is present, thus eliminating total freedom of action
by a single stockholder.27
Under section 532(a), the ultimate test regarding whether the tax
should be imposed is based on the subjective motives of shareholders
(the "subjective test"), i.e., a corporation cannot be formed, or availed
of, with the intention of avoiding tax on its shareholders by accumula-
tion of earnings (the "avoidance purpose"). Section 533(a) creates a pre-
sumption that the avoidance purpose is present if earnings are, in fact,
accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the corporation's business
(the "objective test").28
Recent decisions have tended to reduce the importance of the subjec-
tive test,29 holding that the basic objective test is the single most im-
portant element in determining the presence of the prohibited purpose.
The effect of these decisions is to minimize the usefulness of the subjec-
tive test as an argument for the corporation. The corporation, in a final
effort to save itself, can contend that even if it did accumulate earnings
beyond its reasonable business needs, it did not have the tax avoidance
motive.80
Where business needs for the accumulation have been established, the
government has ordinarily conceded or suffered defeat, despite the theo-
retical possibility that the accumulation was in fact motivated by a tax
avoidance purpose rather than by business needs. Conversely, when an
accumulation has been found to be unreasonable, taxpayers have rarely
26. See McLean & Clark, Additional "Reasonable Needs" Recognized-Code Sec. 537
Amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 1969 TAxEs 45.
27. See also Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 139 (1972).
28. See Ziegler, The "New" Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of Recent Develop-
ments, 22 TAX L. REv. 77, 78 (1966).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Laboratories, 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1967); Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
30. See Brr-xER & EusTICE, supra note 25, at 8-11. The authors write:
Many cases, however, have been presented and decided as though the accumulation
necessarily stems either from a purpose to provide for the reasonable needs of the
business or from a purpose to reduce shareholders' taxes. This false dichotomy prob-
ably arises from section 533(a), which provides that the fact that the earnings are
permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be 'de-
terminative' of the purpose to avoid shareholder income taxes unless the corporation
shall prove to thEe contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. By virtue of this




succeeded in rebutting the inference that tax avoidance was the motive
for the accumulation.31 The recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Donruss Co. 32 makes this latter result almost a foregone con-
clusion.
In the hearings on the 1954 Code the accumulated earnings tax was
strongly criticized,a on the basis that the determination by the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts that a corporation had accumulated
earnings beyond its reasonable business needs was a conclusion after
the fact, thus necessarily having the "far-sightedness" which the corpo-
ration lacked before the fact. 34 The hearings resulted in a number of
changes including the enactment of a provision enabling the burden of
proof to be shifted from the corporation to the Commissioner.8 5
Section 534 places a duty on the secretary or his delegate to notify the
corporate taxpayer of a tax deficiency with respect to the accumulated
earnings tax.88 The taxpayer then has a specified period of time (60
days, plus any extensions) to submit a statement of the grounds, "to-
gether with facts sufficient to show the basis thereof," upon which the
corporation relies to establish that all or part of its earnings were not
accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of its business. If the corpora-
tion submits such a statement or if the secretary does not send the
notice, the burden of proof of the allegation shall be on the secretary
"with respect to the grounds set forth in such statement. '3 7
Section 534 has not been as valuable to corporations as had been ex-
pected. In many cases before the Tax Court the Internal Revenue
Service has successfully claimed that the corporation's statement did not
meet the requirements of the statute and thus did not shift the burden
of proof.38 Also, until recently the Tax Court has steadfastly refused to
rule in advance of trial on the sufficiency of section 534 statements.3 9
31. Id. at 8-11, 8-12.
32. 393 U.S. 297 (1969). The Court held:
It is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the sole purpose for the un-
reasonable accumulation of earnings, it is sufficient if it is one of the purposes for the
company's accumulation policy.
Id. at 298.
33. Hearings on General Revenue Revision before House Comm. on Ways and Means,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2120-54 (1950).
34. Id.; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68-70 (1953).
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 534(a).
36. Id. § 534(b).
37. Id. § 534(a) (2).
38. See, e.g., Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 293 (1962); I.A. Dress Co. v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 93 (1959).
39. Brrxzw & Eusarca, supra note 25, at 8-29.
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Finally, decisions of the Tax Court as to the degree of detail required
in the statement have been unclear, thus giving no guidance to the at-
torney attempting to draft a section 534 statement.40
Since the trend of the courts is toward the application of the objec-
tive test of section 533(a), the concern of the corporate taxpayer is now
centered on proving that any accumulation of earnings and profits was
for reasonable business needs.
Turning to the problem of how the court dealt with that portion of
Isenberg's compensation which it determined to be unreasonable, we
find that the court's treatment of the issue is dicta. 41 The significance
of the case, however, is the Commissioner's unprecedented assertion
that unreasonable compensation should be subject to the accumulated
earnings tax.
The Commissioner in his opening statement and brief argued that
any compensation paid to Isenberg and found by the court to be exces-
sive should be treated as a preferential dividend in view of the fact
that Isenberg owned only 95 per cent of the stock of Dielectric. This
position is grounded on section 562(c) which denies treatment as a divi-
dend, for purposes of the dividends-paid deduction, any distribution
which is not pro rata and without preference. 42
The effect of this argument would be to impose the tax on the disal-
lowed compensation. Insofar as the accumulated earnings tax is funda-
mentally a tax on undistributed income,43 the amount determined as
unreasonable must be added to any other amount (if any) which was
unreasonably accumulated. 44 Though the Commissioner's argument is
40. See Ziegler, The "New" Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of Recent Develop-
ments, 22 TAX L. REv. 77, 82 (1966).
41. The court stated:
We reject respondent's assertion and do not decide the issues as to whether the amount
of Isenberg's compensation determined to be excessive should be treated as a dividend
and consequently whether it should be treated as a dividends-paid deduction.
57 T.C. at 598.
42. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 562(c), Preferential Dividends.-
The amount of any distribution shall not be considered as a dividend for purposes of
computing the dividends paid deduction, unless such distribution is pro rata, with no
preference to any share of stock as compared with other shares of the same class, and
with no preference to one class of stock as compared with another class except to the
extent that the former is entitled (without reference to waivers of their rights by share-
holders) to such preference.
43. BirER & Eusrica, supra note 25, at 8-32.
44. Id. at 7-33. The authors hint at this when they state:
. ..fAin alleged salary might be allocated among a combination of the following
three categories: (a) compensation, deductible by the corporation under section 162
and taxable to the recipient as compensation; (b) unreasonable compensation, not de-
ductible by the corporation under section 162 but-taxable to the recipient as compensa-
tion; and (c) distributions disguised as compensation, not deductible by the corporation
947
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unique, there are cases which support the position that improper
deductions which were not distributed pro rata among stockholders of
the same class are not entitled to a dividends-paid deduction. 45
The court stated that the Commissioner did not "press the matter at
trial," and that Dielectric acceded to the stipulation as to stock owner-
ship, relying on the dividends-paid deduction. Moreover, the court felt
that under the circumstances, Dielectric was not afforded adequate op-
portunity to ask to be relieved of the stipulation and offer evidence
directed to the issue belatedly raised by the Commissioner. Hence, the
court refused to consider whether the amount it determined to be un-
reasonable compensation should be subject to the accumulated earnings
tax via section 562.
The court instead centered its opinion on the issue of whether Di-
electric permitted its earnings and profits to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business. Turning to Dielectric's section 534
statement, the court found that the net effect of the Commissioner's
credits was to reduce Dielectric's purportedly unreasonable accumula-
tions of earnings to $20,531 out of total accumulations of $636,130.4 6
The court felt this margin of error was small, but still enough to make
section 531 applicable. The court found, however, that there was an
unusual factor to be considered. The market shortage of copper and
economic turmoil in the copper industry due to foreign strikes and po-
tential domestic strikes in the copper mines made normal cash flow for-
mulas inapplicable.47 This being the case, the court decided that the
Commissioner's analysis in computing credits for Dielectric did not ade-
and taxable to the shareholder (who is not necessarily the recipient) only under section
301.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Lemp Brewery v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 586 (1952); W.T. Wilson Co. v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 251 (1948).
46. It is interesting to note that the court never determined whether Dielectric's section
534 statement was sufficient to shift the burden to the Commissioner, a general problem
heretofore discussed. The court stated:
Petitioner has asserted that its statement filed pursuant to section 534(c) operated to
shift the burden of proof to respondent. Our ultimate finding of fact herein, in favor
of petitioner, has been made on the assumption that the burden remained with peti-
tioner and, consequently, there is no need for us to deal with petitioner's claim in this
regard.
57 T.C. at 597.
47. See, e.g., Bardahl Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965)
(need for working capital computed by the amount of cash reasonably expected to be
sufficient to cover its operating costs for a single operating cycle); John P. Scripps News-
papers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 453 (1965) ("rule of thumb," ratio of current assets to
current liabilities in the neighborhood of 21 to 1 is an indication of a reasonable ac-
cumulation of surplus); James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 643 (1962) (ac-
cumulation of earnings to meet operating expenses for at least one year is reasonable).
948
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quately take into acount the vagaries of the market situation in which
petitioner expected to, and did, find itself at the end of 1966. Thus, the
court concluded that in light of the total circumstances Dielectric had
sustained the burden of proof that the accumulation of its earnings and
profits for 1966 was required by the reasonable needs of the business.
THE COMMISSIONER'S POSITION: ANALYSIS
The court's skirting of the issue regarding whether section 531 is
applicable to compensation determined to be excessive leaves the prob-
lem unsolved. Analysis of the relevant Code sections leads to the con-
clusion that the Commissioner's position is sound. Section 562(c) 48 dis-
tinctly provides that "any" distribution shall not be considered a divi-
dend for purposes of computing the dividends-paid deduction unless
distributed pro rata to stockholders of the same class. Upon the court's
determination that Isenberg's compensation was excessive, the portion
paid out by Dielectric which was disallowed became a distribution of
the corporation's profits rather than compensation for services. As a
distribution rather than a deduction it becomes subject to section
562(c). Due to the fact that Isenberg owned only 95 per cent of the
stock, this distribution was not pro rata to the holders of the same class
of stock, and as such became a "preferential dividend," thus loosing its
eligibility as a dividends-paid deduction.
Section 53249 imposes the accumulated earnings tax on the "accumu-
lated taxable income" as defined in section 535.50 Section 535(a) defines
"accumulated taxable income" as "taxable income, adjusted in the
manner provided in subsection (b), minus the sum of the dividends-
paid deduction (as defined in section 561) and the accumulated earn-
ings credit (as defined in subsection (c)." Therefore, since Dielectric's
payment of unreasonable compensation does not qualify under section
561 as a dividends-paid deduction, it is not subtracted from its "taxable
income" and hence is exposed to the accumulated earnings tax as "ac-
cumulated taxable income."
CONCLUSION
Assuming arguendo that the problems with respect to the lack of no-
tice to Dielectric did not exist, and that the court would not adhere to
48. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 562(c).
49. Id. § 532.
50. Id. § 535.
949
Duquesne Law Review
the strict interpretation of the pertinent sections of the Code as herein
suggested, it would seem that by the court's own analysis the Commis-
sioner's argument should prevail. Clearly the disallowed deduction for
unreasonable compensation could not be classified as an accumulation
for the "reasonable needs of the business" under the Code definition
or any ordinary dictionary definition. Once an amount is paid out by
the corporation it is gone. To imply that an amount deducted as com-
pensation is simultaneously an amount accumulated for reasonable
needs of the business is an unreasonable conclusion not warranted by
case law.51
On the other hand, a legitimate argument can be made that the ac-
cumulated earnings tax was not intended to be applied to disallowed
compensation deductions. The basic purpose of sections 531 through
537 is to discourage the use of a corporation as an accumulation vehicle
to shelter its individual stockholders from the personal income tax.52 In
a situation where a stockholder-employee has received compensation,
whether reasonable or unreasonable, he must pay personal income tax
on the amount received. Thus; the corporate taxpayer, by paying com-
pensation which is later disallowed, has not acted contrary to the basic
purpose behind the tax.
This argument can be supported by the language used in section
532(a), 53 which imposes the tax on corporations "formed or availed of
for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders ..... 54A corporation which pays unreasonable compensation
to its shareholder-employees is not "availed of" for the purpose of avoid-
ing shareholder income taxes. In fact, it has produced the opposite
effect, since by paying out compensation to its shareholder-employees
the personal income tax will be paid. Therefore, the corporation which
51. See, e.g., New England Wood Ware v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass.
1968) (records of correspondence among board directors revealing a need to either liquidate
or to expand, as well as hiring of a consultant firm to explore new lines of business);
Mohawk Paper Mills v. United States 262 F. Supp. 365 (N.D.N.Y. 1966) (definite plans for
reasonable business needs included: preliminary drawings and cost estimates for new ma-
chinery, and subsequent plant improvements as tangible evidence of the taxpayer's intent
to expand his business). See Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1765 (1964). The holdings of these cases indicate that the definiteness required to
justify accumulations could not be achieved by a deduction which is simultaneously placed
on the records as an accumulation for business needs.
52. BinrKr & Eusmca, supra 25, at 8-3. The authors write:
The Congressional approach to this problem is a rule phrased in terms of the evil
which the statute is designed to prevent, viz, 'unreasonable' accumulations of corporate
earnings for the purpose of avoiding personal income taxation at the shareholder level.
53. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a).
54. Id.
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is overly zealous in compensating its shareholder-employees cannot pos-
sibly fall within the confines of section 532(a).
This argument, however, can be attacked. First, the strict reading of
sections 535(a) and 562, analyzed above, logically requires the applici-
tion of the tax on disallowed compensation deductions. Second, the ac-
cumulated earnings tax is by its nature a penalty tax, whose purpose is
to discourage taxpayers from accumulating earnings rather than dis-
tributing them as dividends to be taxable as ordinary income to the
recipients. Thus, when a corporation deducts unreasonable compensa-
tion for the assumed purpose of avoiding corporate taxes through de-
ductions, it would seem within the punitive spirit of the accumulated
earnings tax to require its application. Third, when section 532(a) is
read with section 533(a), the fact that earnings and profits are permitted
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business is determi-
native of the tax avoidance purpose. The ultimate result of reading
these two sections together is to nullify the "formed or availed of" lan-
guage of section 532(a) whenever an unjustified accumulation is found
under section 533(a).55
These points present an apparent inconsistency between sections
532(a) and 533(a), as well as sections 532(a) and 562, when applied to
the narrow issue of whether the accumulated earnings tax is applicable
to unreasonable compensation. The interpreter of these sections is
faced with the policy consideration of whether this inconsistency should
be construed in a light favorable to the taxpayer. Perhaps it would be
an unreasonable burden on the corporation for the Commissioner to
impose this tax after disallowance of its compensation deduction. The
corporate taxpayer has already suffered a setback by having its deduc-
tion disallowed; the shareholder-employee has already paid personal
income taxes; and now he is faced with an additional tax. Obviously
this presents a heavy burden on the shareholder-employee who also has
the predominant interest in the corporation.
Clearly the court in Dielectric was aware of the consequences which
would result if it accepted the Commissioner's argument. Such a deci-
sion would have a serious impact on a considerable number of corpora-
tions where deductions for compensation have been disallowed. In ef-
55. BrI-rKER & EusTIcE, supra note 27, at 8-11. The authors state:
But section 533 is a mere procedural buttress to section 532; the latter is the basic
operative provision of the statute. The ultimate question, in other words, is not
whether the corporation had business needs for the accumulation, but whether it was
formed or availed of for the prohibited purpose.
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fect, numerous taxpayers would be subjected to an unanticipated tax.
Without any precedent to follow the court was obviously reluctant to
decide upon an issue with such far-reaching effects. Thus, the court
chose to avoid the Commissioner's argument by determining that the
issue was belatedly raised at trial.
Dielectric serves as the vehicle for the introduction of a new and in-
teresting problem. Perhaps it will act as a catalyst for future presentation
and resolution of this issue. The real problem, however, lies with the
lack of lucidity and consistency between the aforementioned sections
when dealing with the application of the accumulated earnings tax to
unreasonable compensation. It is submitted that this lack of clarity is
a matter which should ultimately be settled by Congress.
Richard M. Serbin
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND EXPENSES-
IMPUTATION OF INTEREST TO CONTROLLED CORPORATE LOANS AND AD-
VANCES-TAXABLE INTEREsT-FREE LoANS--The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that section 482 regulations are constitutionally
valid and therefore, the Commissioner is permitted to impute income
to businesses which make interest-free loans to other members of a
controlled group.
Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 496
(1972), rev'd, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973).
The petitioner, Kahler Corporation, was engaged in the business of
owning and operating hotel and motel properties. In 1960 petitioner
decided to expand its business by establishing wholly-owned subsid-
iaries. The subsidiaries' capital structure was patterned according to
the norms of the hotel-motel industry which required a 20-30 per cent
capital investment with the remainder obtained through financing. A
substantial number of advances' bearing no interest or definite ma-
turity date were made by petitioner to the subsidiary. The Com-
missioner sought to "allocate" to petitioner a five per cent interest
1. It was determined that the petitioner owed the First National Bank of Minneapolis,
Rochester Band, and North-Western Mutual Life Insurance Company over 6 million dol-
lars, a part of which was used to make advances to the subsidiaries.
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